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In developing countries, traditional social obligations often press rich individuals to share their income. In this 
paper, we posit a “model of social pressure” in which people can sign binding financial agreements amongst 
themselves, thereby forming coalitions. These financial agreements may help them to alleviate their social 
obligations with respect to income sharing. In the above context, we show that there exists a stable structure of 
coalitions in which people form rotating savings and credit associations (roscas). We therefore provide a 
rationale for one of the most prevalent and puzzling financial institutions. 
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Rotating savings and credit associations (roscas) are one of the most prevalent forms
of informal ﬁnancial institution in developing countries. The basic principle of roscas is
almost the same everywhere.1 A group of people gather for a series of meetings. At each
meeting, everybody contributes to a common pot. The pot is given to only one member
of the group. This member is then excluded from receiving the pot in future meetings,
while still contributing to the pot. This process is repeated until every member receives
the pot. Afterwards, the rosca is disbanded or begins another cycle. The pot may
be allocated randomly (random roscas), through a bidding process (bidding roscas) or
according to pre-determined order (deterministic roscas). In the last case, while the
original allocation order might have been chosen randomly, the order of the winners is
repeated throughout the cycles.
Roscas are very speciﬁc types of agreements. They stipulate a constant contribution
to be paid at regular dates and with an equal lump-sum transfer to be received randomly
in the future. Despite the high degree of speciﬁcity of these ﬁnancial agreements, roscas
exist in most developing countries, in at least three continents (Africa, Asia, Latin
America) and within very diﬀerent populations. In some of these countries, they mobilize
a signiﬁcant proportion of the national savings.2 Roscas' speciﬁcities thus probably
respond in some way to the needs of the population living in these countries. Given
the long-standing and worldwide prevalence of roscas, a natural presumption is that
roscas constitute the best ﬁnancial agreements for their members within the economic
environment and to the social context of these countries. However, there has been no
support to this presumption in the economic literature.3
This paper tries to ﬁll this gap. It argues that a rosca is a suitable ﬁnancial agree-
ment in an economy where there are strong social norms for redistribution and solidarity.
More precisely, we consider an economy where rich individuals are pressed to share their
income, e.g. in order to support their poorer relatives. In such an economy, rich indi-
viduals may thus be willing to ﬁnd a device that may help them to alleviate this form of
1Ardener (1964) proposed the following deﬁnition for a rosca: “An association formed upon a core
of participants who agree to make regular contributions to a fund which is given, in whole or in part, to
each contributor in rotation”.
2See, for example, Bouman (1977) for a list of countries in Africa, Asia, South America, Caribbean,
where roscas exist. Bouman (1995) reports membership rates between 50% and 95% of the adult
population in several African countries. In Cameroon, he mentions that roscas drives about one-half of
national savings.
3Besley, Coate and Loury (1994) have shown that a random rosca is sometimes better than organizing
a credit market. But they agree that roscas are in general ineﬃcient, implying that people can be better-
oﬀ be designing a Pareto-superior ﬁnancial agreement.
2social pressure. We show that a rosca then precisely provides these individuals with such
a device. The basic idea is that individuals belonging to a rosca commit to give money
in the future to other rosca's members. As a result, participating in a rosca reduces their
future available income, and thus, reduces their future vulnerability to social pressure.
In Platteau (2000, p. 231)'s words: “[Roscas] provide a socially accepted alibi to protect
people's saving against all sorts of social pressures”.4
Until now, the literature has mainly investigated two other justiﬁcations for the ex-
istence of roscas. First, roscas may be viewed as a substitute to insurance, particularly
in developing countries where markets for insurance either do not exist or do not func-
tion well. Yet, this interpretation applies only to bidding roscas (e.g. Calomiris and
Rajaraman, 1998), in which the allocation process responds to some individual speciﬁc
shocks, but not for random or deterministic roscas.5
Second, and most notably, roscas may facilitate the purchase of lumpy durable goods.
In their seminal contribution, Besley, Coate and Loury (1993) show that, on average,
roscas allow individuals to buy the desired lumpy goods sooner in their lifetime than by
accumulating private savings.67
There has been recently a renewed interest in the durable good hypothesis. An-
derson and Baland (2002), relies on intra-household conﬂicts in consumption decisions.
Participation in a rosca is a strategy a wife would employ to protect against husband's
tendencies to splurge. Rosca is thus a commitment device that will permit the house-
hold to purchase the durable good. Their result relies on the assumption that the wife
has control over the household revenue during the ﬁrst period, and both the wife and
4Similarly, Belsey (1995, p.117) states that the “anthropological literature makes clear the importance
of social constraints that can make saving unattractive. Certain familial obligations can be diﬃcult to
resist, so that part of any stock of savings may be paid as a transfer.”
5In addition, people that group together in a rosca generally belong to the same village and have
similar occupations and revenues. For instance, Besley, Coate and Loury (1994) mention that the typical
scenario is a group of individuals who work in the same oﬃce block or belong to the same community.
This strong homogeneity is not really compatible with risk-sharing activities.
6Observe that this interpretation applies for random roscas but not for deterministic roscas whereby,
at least after one full cycle, there is no randomness in receiving the pot. Indeed, the member who
receives the pot last could do as well by privately accumulating savings, while not suﬀering from the
lack of ﬂexibility terms of his contribution. This member is thus worse-oﬀ. By backward induction, the
rosca should break down.
7Recently, Gugerty (2000) found empirical evidences from Western Kenya against the lumpy durable
good explanation. She mentions that, in her survey, “over half of roscas participants use their rosca
winning for more than one purpose, and one ﬁfth use their winning for more than two purposes.”.
Furthermore, in the same study, many roscas' participants indicate that they do not necessarily prefer
to receive the pot sooner than later.
3the husband share the control in all the subsequent periods. Gugerty (2000) relies on
intra-personal time-inconsistency. Using a simple illustrative example, she shows, as in
Anderson and Baland (2002), that participating in a rosca helps individuals to commit
to the purchase of the durable good.
Summing up, the present paper displays two distinguishing features with respect to
the main literature on roscas. First, our model does not include any insurance motive
nor any durable good, but captures a well-documented phenomenon of social pressure.
We show that this phenomenon may provide a new justiﬁcation for the existence of a
rosca. Second, we do not simply show that people are better-oﬀ if they save in a rosca
rather than at home. We compare revenues from roscas to revenues from any other kind
of ﬁnancial agreements that can be designed among a group of people. More precisely,
we allow for any random transfers to be carried out among individuals. We consider a
model where individuals form coalitions. We impose the constraint that the coalition
structure should be stable in the precise sense that no group of individuals has any
incentives to deviate by designing and implementing another ﬁnancial agreement. We
then show that random or deterministic roscas (with a random ﬁrst round) form a stable
set of coalitions.
This result relies on two key assumptions. First, as we mentioned above, there exist
social obligations imposing income sharing. People are pressed to distribute a part of
their income, e.g., to assist their relatives. This assumption is supported by anthropolog-
ical works which emphasize the importance of such a social norm in traditional societies.
Among others, Scott (1976) highlights the strength of ethical principles like the right
to subsistence, or moral values emphasizing solidarity and compassion. As argued by
Fafchamps, (1995), this creates internalized moral sanctions for those who deviate from
the social code and some rewards for those who comply with it.8 In our model, this
assistance will take the form of an indivisible gift donated to the community.9
8These sanctions and gratiﬁcations may be enforced through external pressure within the community.
For instance, people may publicly disapprove those who accumulate wealth without sharing it within the
community (see James 1979 , Platteau 1996). On the other hand, the community may reward generous
donors during social events which may take the form of social prestige for instance (see Parkin, 1972,
regarding the rules of ceremonies in which donors are thanked).
9The idea is that social pressure is exerted as long as some expected contribution is not paid. These
gifts are often paid during social events (e.g. Parkin, 1972,). People can either make no gifts or make
the customary gift in its entirety, suggesting that there are indivisibilities with respect to oﬀerings. For
instance, in West Africa, during the traditional muslim feast called “Tabaski”, each adult male, head
of a household, is supposed to sacriﬁce a sheep and share the meat with relatives, neighbors and poor
members of the community. The individual derives social gratiﬁcation from killing the “biggest sheep”
in his herd and supposedly derives no gratiﬁcation form oﬀering half or a quarter of a sheep (personal
4The second assumption is that the social gratiﬁcation derived by the person who
oﬀers the gift has no “anticipated value”. We actually model social gratiﬁcation as a
pure emotional response. The idea is that individuals would prefer not to give, but, when
then they face social pressure, they feel guilty if they do not give. At the same time,
they enjoy acknowledgements, or tokens of aﬀections if they do so. Social gratiﬁcation
or social sanction gives rise to emotions such as guilt, shame or pride. Such emotions are
modelled as temporary preferences consistently with Elster (1998).10 Our approach is
related to present-biased preferences (Akerlof, 1991, O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). It
thus relies on time-inconsistency, as in Gugerty (2000) or Anderson and Baland (2002).
Yet, the source of time-inconsistency is diﬀerent in our model. It is not due to intra-
personal or intra-household conﬂicts but to social pressures, e.g. conﬂicts with relatives.
In other words, we assume that individuals cannot resist day-to-day social pressure.
Yet, the key point is that, ex ante, they are willing to ﬁnd a device to restrain future
over-spending in social obligations.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 presents our model of social pres-
sure. Sections 3 and 4 characterizes the stable ﬁnancial agreement in a static framework.
Section 5 extends for dynamic agreements and show that roscas are stable ﬁnancial agree-
ments. Some empirical implications of our theoretical analysis are discussed in Section
6. Section 7 concludes the paper. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model of Social Pressure
Consider an economy with an inﬁnity number of individuals i 2 N living for several
periods indexed by t. In each period, individual i earns a revenue yi and furthermore,
he is asked to contribute an amount mi to the community. For any individual, giving
mi to the community provides him with a nonpecuniary social gratiﬁcation ±i > 0. The
individual gets no gratiﬁcation (±i = 0) if he gives less than mi; and no extra gratiﬁcation
if he gives more than mi. Utility of pure consumption is denoted ui(:). In such a simple
model, it is optimal for the individual to spend mi if and only if11
ui(yi ¡ mi)+±i >u i(yi): (1)
observation).
10Elster writes (1998, page 70): “Some of the remarks I made about shame and guilt suggest that
emotions could be modelled as temporary preferences. The person who sees a beggar in the street and
feels an urge to give him money, or the person who is in the grip of shame and feels an urge to kill
himself, may be viewed as undergoing a short-term change of preferences. It is in fact an important
feature of many occurrent emotions that they have relatively short duration”.
11Notice that ±i can also be interpreted as a social sanction from not fulﬁlling traditional solidarity
obligations. In this case, it appears as a negative term in the right-hand side of the inequality.
5We assume that ui(:) is increasing and concave. In words, this means that poorer people
attach relatively less value to social gratiﬁcation with respect to immediate consumption.
Let yi be high enough so that 1 holds.
Importantly, we assume that, from an ex ante point of view, ±i has no value. Hence,
viewed from period t ¡ 1 and before, it will never be optimal to spend money in period
t since:
ui(yi ¡ mi) <u i(yi): (2)
However the individual anticipates that, at time t, inequality 1 will apply and it will
then turn out to be optimal to spend money mi. In other words, we consider time-
inconsistent sophisticated individuals (Akerlof, 1991, O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). At
every period, the individual cannot resist to giving mi. Yet, he knows this in advance
and would want to be able to resist to it.
Note that, under concavity, there exists a unique revenue y
i that makes an agent
indiﬀerent between giving mi or not:
ui(y
i ¡ mi)+±i = ui(y
i): (3)
Clearly, y
i exists and is unique because the marginal gain of renouncing to ±i, ui(y) ¡
ui(y¡mi), is decreasing with y. To summarize, for any y 2 R+, one can deﬁne an agent
ex ante utility by:
vi(y)=
(
ui(y ¡ mi) if y > y
i
ui(y) if y · y
i
: (4)











Figure 1: Ex ante utility function
0
Notice that there is a downward jump in the ex ante utility function, thereby gen-
erating a non-concavity. This implies that people could be better oﬀ by randomizing
their revenue by playing lotteries.
3 Eﬃcient Lotteries
In this section, we examine the lottery that an individual i would like to play. Let us
ﬁrst deﬁne a lottery.
Deﬁnition 1 A lottery Li =( K;p;Ti) is deﬁned by:
² A set of states of nature K = f1;:::;kg.
² A probability measure p on K where p(l) denotes the probability of state l for any
l 2 K:
² A set of transfers Ti = ftl
igl2K where tl
i denotes the transfer assigned in state l.
7Notice that, in this deﬁnition, we choose to map the probability measure p on states







Now, we need to introduce a measure for the total transfers that individual i expect to
receive, or what we will call the “cost” of a lottery. The cost of a lottery is equal to the
sum of the transfers associated with it.




An eﬃcient lottery then maximizes i's expected utility (as deﬁned in 5) for a given
cost xi. In Lemma 1, we characterize the transfers of such an eﬃcient lottery.
Lemma 1 Any eﬃcient lottery assigned to an individual i randomizes between two
transfers ¡ti = y
i ¡ yi and ¯ ti such that
ui(yi ¡ mi + ¯ ti) ¡ ui(yi ¡ ti)
¯ ti + ti
= u0
i(yi ¡ mi + ¯ ti): (6)
A graphical analysis can be useful to understand the intuition leading to Lemma 1.
An arbitrary lottery Li is depicted in Figure 1. The outcome of any draw is an ex post
revenue yi +tl
i which translates into ex ante utility vi(yi +tl
i). Graphically, it is a point
on vi. The set of expected utilities that can be achieved is the convex hull of vi(yi + tl
i)
for every tl




i 2 Ti. A probability measure p deﬁnes an unique point in this set. Or, put
diﬀerently, any point in this set can be achieved with the right probability measure.
The lottery L¤
i randomizes between transfers ¡ti and ¯ ti yielding ex post revenues
y
i ´ yi ¡ ti and ¯ yi ´ yi + ¯ ti. These two outcomes are represented by points A and B in
Figure 2.12
12Notice that equation 6 states that at point B with coordinates (¯ yi;v i(¯ yi)), the line starting from A
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Figure 2: Upper Bound on Expected Utility Levels
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Clearly, it is welfare improving for any individual whose revenue yi lies between y
i
and ¯ yi. But it also dominates any other lottery which, indeed, would yield an expected
payoﬀ strictly below the line AB. In particular, including transfers in addition to ti and
¯ ti yields an expected payoﬀ strictly below AB. This remains true for any transfer other
than ti or ¯ ti. To sum-up, in Figure 2, the upper envelope of the graph represents an
upper bound on agent i's expected payoﬀ that can be achieved with lotteries. Denoting
¹ (resp. 1 ¡ ¹) the probability to pay ¡ti (resp. to receive ¯ ti), the eﬃcient lottery L¤
i
yields to individual i an expected payoﬀ
Ui(L¤
i)=¹u(y
i)+( 1¡ ¹)u(¯ yi ¡ mi); (7)
located along the line AB. In the next section, we show that stability picks up a single
lottery among the eﬃcient lotteries, one point in this upper envelope.
4 Static Analysis
We now turn to the design of ﬁnancial agreements. As a ﬁrst step, we restrict our
attention to a static framework. At the beginning of the period (say at date 0) people
9may sign ﬁnancial agreements. After this contracting stage, an equilibrium structure of
ﬁnancial agreement emerges in the economy. Then agreements are carried out. Each
agent performs transfers as speciﬁed in the contract and then either gives mi or nothing,
depending on his remaining wealth after transfers.
We need to introduce more deﬁnitions. First, let us ﬁrst formally deﬁne what we
call a “ﬁnancial agreement” (FA). In short, a FA is a contract among a group of agents
assigning payments among them (including random payments). It is assumed binding:
people cannot default (or at inﬁnite cost). The random procedure (if any) and payment
structure are freely chosen by agents so that no restrictions are imposed on the space of
contracts. Formally, a FA is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3 A ﬁnancial agreement Cj =( Nj;fLigi2Nj) is deﬁned by:
² A set of agents Nj ½ N
² A set of lotteries fLigi2Nj = f(Kj;p j;T i)gi2Nj with common set of states of nature
Kj = f1;:::;kjg and probability measure pj on Kj.
² Lotteries are budget-balanced state-by-state:
P
i2Nj tl
i · 0 in each state of nature
l 2 Kj.
In words, a ﬁnancial agreement deﬁnes a group of members Nj who perform random
transfers or lotteries fLigi2Nj =( Kj;p j;T i) amongst themselves, which are budget
balanced in each draw.
Because transfers are budget balanced state-by-states, costs xi must sum-up to zero









i = 0 (8)
We now turn to our deﬁnition of stability. Denote C = fCjgj2N a structure of ﬁnancial
agreements (SFA). We ask it to be stable in the sense deﬁned below.





is stable if, no other FA C0
j =( S;fL0
igi2S) is such that
² Ui(L0
i) ¸ Ui(L¤
i) for every i 2 S.
² Uh(L0
h) >U h(L¤
h) for at least one h 2 S.
A SFA is stable if no any group of agent can be better-oﬀ by designing another FA.
When it is not the case, this group would deviate and agree on their own FA. Notice
10that stability implies that the lotteries part of a FA are eﬃcient. Thus, Lemma 1 which
characterizes eﬃcient lotteries applies. We examine now the implication of stability for
these eﬃcient lotteries.
Lemma 2 A stable SFA includes only zero cost lotteries.
Lemma 2 states that no individual subsidizes other people by playing a negative cost
lottery. If it was the case, such an individual would be better oﬀ by forming another FA
in which he plays a zero cost eﬃcient lottery. Formally, Lemma 2 imposes the following
restriction on the probability distribution (summarized by ¹i):
¹iti =( 1¡ ¹i)¯ ti (9)
We have established that the highest payoﬀ that any arbitrary agent can achieve in
a stable structure of FAs is:
Ui(L¤
i)=¹iui(yi ¡ ti)+( 1¡ ¹i)ui(yi ¡ mi + ¯ ti); (10)
where ti ´ yi ¡ y
i, ¯ ti and ¹i are deﬁned respectively by 3, 6 and 9. This payoﬀ can
be achieved by forming a one-period rosca of size ni = 1
1¡¹i (provided that it is an
integer) and contribution ti with other people with identical needs for ti and ¯ ti. The
pot is ¯ ti =
¹i
1¡¹iti. When 1
1¡¹i is not an integer, this one-period rosca of size given by
either the smallest integer larger than 1
1¡¹i, or the largest integer smaller than 1
1¡¹i








ui(yi ¡ mi +( 1¡ ni)ti); (11)
located at point O in Figure 2. We now turn to the multi-period problem.
5 Multi-Period Model
This section will extend previous results to a multi-periodic framework. To simplify, we
assume that every individual lives for an inﬁnity of periods and values time according





As before, any individual can design and sign binding ﬁnancial agreements with the
other individuals.
11Let us now compute the intertemporal utility of an individual i who belongs to a ni
persons rosca. First, when he joins the rosca, either a random rosca or a deterministic
one, he does not know in which period he will have the pot.13 Moreover, this individual
knows that if he wins the pot in some period then he will be excluded from the draw in
the subsequent periods during a cycle. So, each cycle, he is sure to get the pot exactly
once. There is thus a probability 1
ni that he will have the pot at date h for each date of
the cycle. In this case, his payoﬀ will be vi(yi +( ni ¡ 1)ti)=ui(yi ¡ mi +( ni ¡ 1)ti)i n
period h and ui(yi¡ti) in the other periods t =1 ;:::;ni;t6= h. Hence, the intertemporal


















ui(yi ¡ mi +( ni ¡ 1)ti)]: (13)
Since, viewed from date 0, the expected outcome of all cycles are identical, the extension
to an inﬁnity of periods is straightforward. The payoﬀ at date 0 of any member of the









u(yi ¡ mi +( ni ¡ 1)ti)g: (14)
Observe now that this last expression is the exact multi-periodic extension of the static
expression 11 obtained in the previous section. Hence, any individual may get the same
expected utility by forming a rosca as by playing eﬃcient lotteries identically in each pe-
riod. Nevertheless, this does not mean that a rosca is an eﬃcient lottery over the space
of all possible lotteries. Indeed, one needs to consider the space of all “dynamic lotter-
ies”, not only the space of static ones. Typically, a rosca is not a static lottery since the
probability that an individual gets the pot depends on previous draws. The next theo-
rem, formally proved in Appendix C, extends previous results for such dynamic lotteries.
Theorem A structure of ﬁnancial agreement composed by random roscas and/or
deterministic roscas (with random initial ordering) is stable.
13We consider deterministic roscas with random initial ordering. Observe that the only diﬀerence
between random and deterministic roscas is that with deterministic rosca the order is the same in all
cycles. Yet, this diﬀerence does not matter under expected utility preferences.
12The above theorem establishes that roscas are stable ﬁnancial contracts. The proof
is similar to the one derived in the static framework. It proceeds in two steps. First,
we show that Lemma 1 applies so that i' eﬃcient lottery randomizes between only two
transfers, ti and ¯ ti, at any date t. Second, we show that any group of agent cannot
improve their gain by deviating from a SFA composed by roscas.
So, why is a rosca eﬃcient in our model? The intuition obviously rests on the
existence of social pressure. We have represented an economy where an individual is
tempted to give m when he is rich enough. An helpful ﬁnancial agreement reduces this
individual's future available income in order to make him poor enough so that he will
not be anymore inclined to give m. This may be done by paying a ﬁxed contribution t
committed in advance at regular dates. However, this contribution t should not be a pure
loss of course. As there are an inﬁnite number of contributors in the economy, people
with the same contributions t pool together in a group.14 The sum of contributions of
the group is then collected and redistributed to only one member of the group. Only
this latter individual thus has to pay the social gift m.15 One understands then why
roscas are stable eﬃcient agreements and thus eﬃcient for their members.16 Indeed a
rosca minimizes in every period the social gift of the groups' members while everybody
in the group will receive back at some point the total of his own contributions.
6 Simple Theoretical Predictions
This theoretical result raises the question of whether there is some empirical support
for our model. Since key parameters such as the individual social gratiﬁcation ±i are
unobservable, there is little hope of getting any direct empirical support to our model.
An indirect way is thus to derive some theoretical implications.
To make it simple, recall Figure 2. Observe that any individual with a revenue
below y
i or above ¯ yi will not participate in a rosca. The idea is that poor individuals do
14The assumption that there is an inﬁnite number of people in the economy is thus an important
simplifying assumption. If it was not the case, the ﬁnancial agreement would compromise to account
for member's heterogeneous contributions. This may explain for instance the existence of roscas with
variable contribution documented by Henry et al. (1990) in the case of Cameroon.
15Observe that our result does not explain why winners are excluded of the pot in the subsequent
periods. So, why is it the case? Without excluding winners, observe that ex post inequality will be
higher, as some individuals may receive the pot several times while other individuals may not receive
the pot at all. Roscas thus minimize wealth inequality of each draw, which is a nice fairness property.
This property is not captured in our expected utility framework.
16Recalls that the population facing social pressure constitute a sub-population of the economy. There-
fore, even if Roscas are optimal within this population, there are generally not for the whole economy.
13not face social pressure, thus they do not have any interest in participating to a rosca.
Conversely, very rich individuals would have to pay a very high contribution in order to
escape social pressure. As a result, it is too costly for them to participate in a rosca.
Moreover, notice that any individual with initial revenue yi 2 [y
i; ¯ yi] increases his
expected utility (corresponding to point O on Figure 2) if he participates to a rosca. To
do so, he must form a rosca with people who have the same needs for transfers, i.e., a
rosca where the contribution is ti = yi¡y
i and where the received transfer is ti =¯ yi¡yi.
Also, the budget constraint implies that he will form a rosca with ni persons where
ni =
ti + ¯ ti
ti
:
From these observations, we can easily derive three clear-cut predictions:
² #1 Average-income individuals are more likely to belong to a rosca compared to
very poor or very rich people;
² #2 Within roscas, members are homogeneous and, across roscas, the contribution
increases with the revenue of members;
² #3 When the contribution is relatively larger, the size of the group is relatively
lower.
Several empirical studies support these predictions. First, Anderson et al. (2002)
provide some support to prediction #1. They interviewed people living in a poor slum
in Kenya. They showed that roscas' participants in that slum are more likely to have
a higher income, be employed as permanent workers and have lived longer in the slum
under study. Intuitively, people with higher incomes, with a steady job or those who
have lived longer in the area are more likely to be subject to social pressures. Hence, they
are more likely to be willing to participate in a roscas. Along the same line, Levenson
and Besley (1996) provide evidences that participation is higher among high-income
households in Taiwan. Note that these observations are quite puzzling with respect
to the durable good hypothesis. Indeed, higher income people and permanent workers
within a slum should in principle have more facilities to ﬁnance a durable good by their
own means. Hence, they should be less likely to rely on roscas as compared to poorer
people and non-permanent workers living in the same slum.
Furthermore, Handa and Kirton's (1999) empirical results from Jamaica seem to
be quite consistent with our prediction as well. Firstly, they found that there is high
homogeneity among roscas' members (see #2). This ﬁnding is consistent as well with
14other studies such as the one on Gambia by Nagarajan, Meyer and Graham (1999).17
Secondly, Handa and Kirton indicate that there are two main broad categories of roscas
in their panel. The ﬁrst and most common type is a rosca with many members and
with a small contribution. The second and less frequent type of roscas has fewer and
richer members, meets at longer intervals and has a larger size of contribution. These last
ﬁndings are thus consistent with our prediction #3, together with the second part of #2.
The underlying economic idea is that, other things equal, individuals with low (large)
revenues will need a low (large) contribution to cope with social pressures, namely to
reduce appropriately their available income. Besides, they need more (less) contributing
members in order to get the desired pot.
7 Conclusion
Understanding the rationale underlying informal institutions in developing countries is
one of the main challenges of development economics. Among these informal institutions,
roscas are one of the more common and puzzling. Since the paper by Besley, Coate and
Loury (1993), the economic literature has been almost exclusively developed under the
durable good hypothesis. This hypothesis claims that people participate to roscas in
order to facilitate the purchase of a indivisible durable good.
We believe that this hypothesis is unsatisfactory, or at least incomplete. In particu-
lar, it seems that there may exist various justiﬁcations for the existence of roscas. For
instance, self-reported reasons for joining roscas (Anderson and al. 2002, Gugerty, 2000,
Henry et al. 1990) often indicate that members view roscas as a mean through which
they bind themselves to a particular savings rate.18 In this paper, we have introduced
an hypothesis which may explain this phenomenon. We have assumed that people face
an external social pressure to share their income. Roscas may then be viewed as a
commitment device that may help them to resist sharing obligations. Furthermore, the
theoretical literature on roscas has never fully rationalized the existence of rosca, as it
17Nagarajan, Meyer and Graham (1999) study a rosca called “osusu”. They indicate that: “While
three-fourths of the sampled osusus were composed of occupationally homogenous members, about two-
thirds were composed of members homogenous in age or gender. About half of the sampled osusus were
simultaneously homogenous in gender, age and employment type.”
18Examples abound: “You can't save alone-it is easy to misuse money”, “Sitting with other members
helps you to save”, “It is diﬃcult to keep money at home as demands are high” (Gugerty, 2000); “The
rosca forces you to save” (Henry et al.; 1990, our translation), “Joining a merry-go-round [i.e., a local
rosca] is the only way to save some money. If I leave it at home, it will disappear” (Anderson and
Baland, 2002).
15has not explained why this exact form of ﬁnancial contracts emerges.19 Here, we have
shown that, within a population composed of individuals facing social pressure, roscas
are stable ﬁnancial agreements.
To conclude, a word is maybe required on the compatibility between our hypothesis
regarding social pressure and the durable good hypothesis. Interestingly, Gugerty (2000)
provides evidence on both, e.g., that roscas' members can sometimes force the winner
of the pot to spend his money on a durable good. Our result is obviously consistent
with this ﬁnding as well since we have not made any assumption concerning the use of
the pot. Moreover, it is easy to understand that people facing social pressure would
probably beneﬁt even more from joining a rosca if the pot is explicitly devoted to the
purchase of a durable good. The idea is that the ex ante desirability of a lottery stems
from the non-convexity of preferences created by the indivisibility of the social gift.
Consequently, the additional presence of an indivisible durable would create another
source of non-convexity in preferences. It will thus make probably even stronger the
need for randomization in the ﬁnancial agreements. Another important idea is that if
the pot is used to buy a durable good, then it can not be divided among relatives. As a
result, individuals can resist more easily to social pressure after they have received the
pot.
19As recognized for instance by Besley, Coate and Loury (1994): “Roscas do not, in general, produce
eﬃcient allocations. Their simple structure allows less ﬂexibility in the rate of accumulation of the
indivisible good than is necessary to achieve maximal gains from trade”. This paper obtains a very
contrasting result. Indeed, since roscas are stable ﬁnancial agreements, they produce eﬃcient allocations
within the population facing social pressure. This population is, of course, just a sub-population of the
economy.
16A Proof of Lemma 1
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i > ¡tig. The proof
proceeds in four steps. First, we show that i's utility is higher when receiving a positive transfer. Second,
we prove that if an agent has to give money to escape social pressure, then he will give the minimum
transfer ¡ti. Any increase in the transfer reduces consumption smoothing. Thirdly, we establish that,
due to consumption smoothing, all transfers higher than ti must be the same, equal to ti. Putting it
diﬀerently, when escaping social obligation, i prefers to receive the same amount. Lastly, we derive the
ﬁrst order condition deﬁning ¯ ti.
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We have shown in Step 1 that u(yi¡mi+t
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Step 4: First order condition deﬁning ¯ ti.
Let ¹ (1 ¡ ¹) be the probability that i pays ti (receives ¯ ti). Note that ¯ ti solves maxt ¹ui(yi ¡ ti)+
(1 ¡ ¹)ui(yi ¡ mi + t) subject to ¹(¡ti)+( 1¡ ¹)t = xi. Substituting ¹ deﬁned in the constraint in the
objective function and diﬀerentiating it with respect to t yields 6 as a ﬁrst order condition.
17B Proof of Lemma 2
First, we show that any SFA C








¤ randomizing between transfers ¡t and ¯ t. Suppose that xf > 0 for one agent
f 2 Nj. Equation 8 implies that xe < 0 for at least another agent e 2 Nj. Pick up any agent h of
another FA, Ck 2 C
¤, randomizing between same transfers ¡t and ¯ t in a lottery of cost xh · 0. Design
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i)¯ tjg > 0. Thus, C
0
j does not satisfy 8, which contradicts that C
0
j is a FA.
C Proof of the Theorem
The proof is organized in three steps. Step 1 extends the deﬁnition of a FA to a multi-period framework.
Step 2 conﬁrms that Lemma 1 still applies within the multi-period framework. Finally, step 3 shows
that a SFA composed by roscas is stable.
Step 1 Extension of the deﬁnition of a FA to a multi-period framework.
A multi-period FA, Cj =( Nj;fLigi2Nj) is still deﬁned by a group of agents Nj. But now, each
member faces a sequence of per-period lotteries. For simplicity, it is still denoted Li. Each per-period
lottery part of this sequence might depend on previous draws. Without loss of generality, all these
lotteries can be deﬁned on a common set of states of nature Kjt. However, the probability measure on
Kjt might be contingent on the previous realized states of nature.
Since the contracting choices occur only at date 0 the choices are guided by probabilities computed
at date 0. Formally, denoting pjt the probability at date 0 that state l 2 Kit is drawn at date t, the










Step 2 Lemma 1 still applies within the multi-period framework.
18Any eﬃcient sequence of lotteries Li still maximizes 17 subject to a sequence of per-period costs
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cost xit for every date t. Hence Lemma 1 applies.
Step 3 A SFA composed by roscas is stable.





such that every member i 2 S is not worse oﬀ and at least one member h 2 S is strictly better oﬀ than
with a SFA with only roscas. Then C
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where ¹i = ni ¡ 1
ni (Recall that ni denotes the optimal size of the rosca for individual i).
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it are the respective costs (viewed
from date 0) of the per-period lotteries played at date t. Since these costs sum-up to 0 for roscas, i.e.
x
¤
it = 0 for every t, at least one per-period lottery cost x
0
it is strictly positive, which contradicts the
supposition that C
0
j i saF A .
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